Information exchanges are at the heart of most European and national invstigations nowadays.
In fact, they cover a substantive part of the Commission's Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation.
However, the development of such an infringement has come at the expense of legal certainly as it implies, de facto,redrawing the red lines that safeguard Article 101 TFUE. By punishing this behavior as a "self-sanding" infringement, the área of protection of Article 101TFEU is existence of a cartel, it suffices to show that the Exchange (or disclosure) could most logically end up in a cartel, for the practice tob e prohibited and punished.
This raises several questions that this book seeks to answer: is thre an economic basis for such a conclusión? If so, does this infringement fit within the wording and purpose of Article 101 TFEU? And ultimately, as with any other infringement, how can we avoid commiting type - mistake while ensuring the effectivity of Article 101 TFUE?
Addressed towards practitioners and scholars this book provides a useful toolkit for analyzing information exchanges and their likelihook to carry out a fine while, at the same time, develops a systematic analysis on the legal nature of Article 101 TFEU.